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Introduction 
This paper addresses the question of how and when fact-finders in criminal trials (primarily, but not 
exclusively, jurors) can be permitted to listen to audio recordings with a view to identifying the 
speaker. This is usually done with a view to establishing that the speaker on the tape is the defendant. 
In conducting such an exercise, jurors are being asked to conduct a voice-comparison exercise. We 
argue that insufficient attention has been paid by the legal system to the variables which might impact 
upon the accuracy of that voice-comparison exercise and, as a result of this, there are insufficient 
safeguards in the law as it currently stands. For the purposes of discussion, we primarily focus our 
attention on the law as it stands in England and Wales but as what we say in relation to the factors 
which impact upon accuracy in such exercises is of universal application, it is relevant to the Anglo-
American evidence system as a whole. 
The Anglo-American tradition of evidence scholarship assumes a rationalist approach to the 
admissibility of evidence. The rationalist tradition strives for rectitude of decision making achieved 
through ‘rational’ methods for the assessment of evidence. An assessment of the validity of an 
institution’s rules of evidence is based upon an assessment of whether it maximises the chances that 
an accurate decision will be made.1 The legal system seeks to maximise accuracy through a 
triangulation of rules of admissibility (which serve to address the risk that fact-finders may make 
irrational decisions when presented with evidence of persuasive but not objective value), judicial 
directions to the jury (which act as a framework to promote rational analysis of the evidence) and 
procedural rules for the collections and presentation of evidence (which serve to facilitate the 
presentation of evidence in a fair and efficient way). 
                                                          
1 See for example Twining W. Theories of Evidence:Bentham & Wigmore. 1st Edition.  London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, c1985, Chapter 3 
In this paper we draw upon the current disciplinary knowledge within psychology to evaluate whether 
the legal position in relation to voice-comparison exercises does all it can to maximise accuracy. The 
issue of whether or not jurors can be permitted to listen to a recording of an incident in order to assist 
them in determining whether the voice on the recording is that of the defendant has long been 
controversial. Although the inherent danger in permitting such an exercise is well-recognised,2 there 
remain no definitive guidelines for judges or advocates on the circumstances in which it should be 
permitted, the conditions in which the comparison should be made and how juries should be directed 
to approach a voice-comparison exercise. Although in the majority of cases, the primary comparison 
will be presented by means of an expert opinion, the jury’s assessment of that opinion will inevitably 
be informed by their own assessment of the similarity between the two voices they hear. In cases 
where there is no expert analysis there may be evidence from a ‘lay-listener’ (someone familiar with 
the defendant’s voice) who purports to recognise the speaker and whose claim the jury will have to 
assess. Where these issues have been considered by the appellate courts, the primary focus has been to 
the quality of the recording the jury are presented with rather than other variables which might impact 
upon the accuracy of the comparison exercise. In this paper we discuss some of the issues that are 
relevant in assessing the accuracy of voice-comparisons. We suggest that clear guidance is urgently 
needed to ensure that, as far as possible, if jurors are required to undertake a voice-comparison 
exercise it is conducted in such a way that the prospects of an erroneous conclusion being reached are 
minimised. We begin by outlining the current legal position in England and Wales and other 
jurisdictions. We go on to review research relevant to understanding likely sources of inaccuracy in 
voice-comparison exercises. Our aim is to identify some of the variables that may impact upon the 
accuracy of voice-comparison exercise and suggest how the justice system might seek to prevent 
misidentifications occurring. 
The position in Law in England and Wales 
                                                          
2 Ormerod D. “Sounding out expert voice identification. Expert Evidence and Scientific Proof in Criminal 
Trials.” Crim. Law. Rev.2002. 770 – 790. 
Recordings are prima facie admissible as best evidence as a matter of law.3 The purpose for which 
they can be used varies. Often they are presented by the prosecution as a means of evidencing the 
contents of a conversation, where the speakers are identified but where there is a dispute as to the 
context in which the words are spoken or what is being said. In some cases however, the issue the 
recordings address is the identity of the speaker, the resolution of which may determine whether a 
‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ verdict is reached. In such cases a comparison needs to be made between the 
recording and an uncontested sample of the defendant’s voice (either recorded on a prior occasion or 
as heard testifying in court). In many cases, this comparison will have been conducted by an expert 
and the jury will use the recordings to assess whether the expert is correct in their conclusion. In other 
cases juries have been entrusted to conduct the exercise without an expert.  
Voice-comparisons are most frequently deployed by the prosecution in inculpating an accused 
although they are equally valuable as an exculpatory device for the defence. For example, in Flynn 
and St John the defence sought to invite the jury to compare the defendants’ voices with the recording 
produced by the prosecution to establish a difference. 4  In Kapikanya, a co-accused (Robinson) was 
permitted to introduce recordings of telephone calls to establish that Kapikanya was the main operator 
in a telephone fraud rather than him. The jury were permitted to make their own comparisons. 
Much of the discussion surrounding the playing of recordings has arisen in the context of 
controversies surrounding the two techniques by which expert comparison of voice recordings takes 
place; auditory analysis and acoustic analysis. Auditory analysis involves the expert listening to a 
portion of recorded speech and a portion of known speech and then using their phonetic expertise to 
identify points of dissimilarity. Acoustic analysis is based upon an electronic representation of the 
sound produced, with the expert being called upon to interpret the spectrograph produced and 
compare contested and known samples. A much fuller discussion of the merits of these approaches is 
conducted by Ormerod.5 Where auditory analysis is conducted the expert conducting the analysis will 
usually be working with two or more samples of speech taken from the recording. Where the results 
                                                          
3 R v Howells [1965] 2 All ER 464 
4R v Flynn and St John [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 20 
5Op Cit n 2. 
are contested and the expert is required to testify before the court, the materials on which the analysis 
is based should be presented to the jury. 6   
In 2002, Ormerod cautioned that: 
‘If the jury have not heard expert evidence on the voice identification, it is submitted that 
there are serious risks involved in allowing them to conduct ad hoc voice identification in the 
courtroom, whether by comparing a recording of the voice of the offender with a recording of 
the accused or with the voice of the accused heard live at trial. The dangers inherent in any 
stranger voice identification, exacerbated by the delay between hearing the voices, the stress 
of the exercise in the courtroom, the danger of bias, the risk of over-confidence from the 
jurors, all point strongly against this as a worthwhile exercise in terms of the likely accuracy 
of outcome.’7 
In discussing the role jurors should play in assessing the evidence of an expert he noted that: 
‘It remains arguable that the jury might be usefully performing the qualitatively different 
exercise of monitoring the experts' activity if they are provided with an opportunity to 
compare the recordings for themselves. Provided the limitations of voice recognition and 
comparison are made clear to them, they will be better able to evaluate the expert evidence.’8 
 The Court of Appeal endorsed this approach in Chenia.9 The case in Chenia was based in part on the 
assertion that the defendant was the speaker captured on a considerable number of surveillance tapes. 
The jury were directed that they could use their own judgment about ‘who was talking about what, 
why and with whom.’ In allowing the appeal the Court of Appeal commented that; 
“[W] e do not think that a jury should, as it were, be asked to be their own voice expert. We 
have reached the conclusion that, on the particular facts of this case, where the jury were 
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unassisted by expert evidence, they should have been warned that they should not compare 
one voice with another by comparing the characteristics of each because of the dangers of 
doing so.” 
The notion that Chenia was a bar to jurors ever conducting their own comparison was rejected in 
Flynn and St John, another case involving surveillance recordings. These were played to the jury with 
an expert and police officer confirming the speakers were the defendants. The trial judge directed the 
jury not to attempt any comparison themselves. It was conceded on appeal that this direction was 
incorrect. 
The nature of the direction given by a judge in cases where an expert witness makes a comparison 
was revisited in Suleman.10 Suleman faced multiple counts of arson and making hoax 999 calls. In 
relation to these charges the Crown sought to adduce expert evidence comparing the recordings of the 
999 calls with the defendant’s voice as recorded in interview. The judge informed the jury that they 
were not to engage in their own assessment of whether the voices matched but to treat them as a 
means of showing how the expert reached his assessment. In the summing up, the judge directed the 
jury that in considering the evidence “you are entitled to consider the voices using your own common 
sense.” It was argued on behalf of the appellant that this undermined the judge’s previous warning. 
The Court of Appeal rejected this stating that the judge was doing no more than “reassuring the jury 
that in judging the weight of Professor French's opinion they were entitled to recollect the voices they 
heard.” 
Flynn now forms the basis for the general guidance given by the Bench Book to judges on how to 
direct juries when dealing with cases of voice identification/recognition.  
Recordings are mentioned briefly where it is stated that; 
                                                          
10 R v Suleman [2012] EWCA Crim 1569 
“If juries are permitted to listen to recordings to try to identify speakers, they should be 
reminded to bear in mind the evidence of the voice recognition witnesses and warned of the 
dangers of relying on their own untrained ears: Flynn and St John.”11 
The authorities and guidance above deal solely with cases where the evidence which is sought to be 
adduced comes from the prosecution and is substantiated by an expert. The case of Kapikanya 
suggests the Court of Appeal have not prohibited identifications being made solely by juries without 
the support of an expert.12 Kapikanya was charged, alongside others, with a series of mortgage frauds.  
His defence was that he was an innocent party to a series of transactions in which he believed the 
others involved were acting honestly. One of the co-defendants, Robertson, claimed that he too was 
an innocent party who had been duped by Kapikanya into participating in the frauds under false 
pretences. Kapikanya gave evidence over several days. Robertson did not testify but his counsel 
cross-examined Kapikanya at length. In the course of cross-examination, Robertson’s counsel put to 
Kapikanya, a recording of a conversation between one of the building societies who advanced the 
monies and a man who claimed to be one of the victims. It was accepted that the latter was an 
imposter. It was put to Kapikanya by Robertson’s counsel that his was the voice on the recording. 
Kapikanya denied that he was the person speaker. The prosecution did not seek to rely upon the 
recording or make the assertion that the appellant was the caller. Counsel for Kapikanya requested 
that the jury be directed that they should not conduct their own identification and to disregard the 
recording. The trial judge declined to give such a direction. He instead directed the jury that although 
expert evidence was often called in this type of case, that this should not preclude them making an 
identification. He gave the jury a ‘Turnbull’ direction on the risks inherent with identification and 
drew their attention to some of the areas which might affect their assessment. On appeal following 
conviction, the Court of Appeal concluded that nothing in either Chenia or Flynn required the judge to 
prevent the jury conducting their own identification. The Court noted that the judge was under a duty 
to allow Robertson to advance his defence fairly and therefore had to undergo a difficult exercise in 
                                                          
11 Judicial College. The Crown Court Compendium – Part 1 Jury and Trial Management and Summing Up 
February 2017 at 15.7 para 3 
12 R v Kapikanya [2015] EWCA Crim 1507 
striking a balance. They also accepted that the clarity of the recordings was better than in Chenia or 
Flynn and that the jury were able to hear the contested sample juxtaposed against the defendant’s 
voice in cross-examination. In the circumstances the Court concluded that the directions given by the 
judge were adequate to meet any risk of injustice. 
Whilst any analysis of Kapikanya must reflect the fact that, as the evidence was being introduced by 
the defence, and therefore the trial judge had a very little by way of an exclusionary discretion it does 
appear to give foundation to an argument that juries can be permitted to conduct voice comparison 
exercises without the assistance of an expert. Commentary in recent editions of Archbold have 
suggested that the approach in the Australian case of Korgbara (discussed below) should be followed 
in England and Wales.13 This approach leaves it to the discretion of the trial judge to decide whether 
the material is sufficient to allow a direct jury comparison, unsupported by evidence. 
Some approaches in other jurisdictions 
 
Whilst the issues relating to how recordings are played in court have therefore been touched upon in 
English and Welsh case law, the issue has inevitably arisen in other jurisdictions. Perhaps the most 
helpful analysis of some of the problems comes in the Northern Irish case of O’Doherty.14 In this 
case, in addition to auditory expert evidence called on behalf of the prosecution, the jury were invited 
to make their own comparison between a recording of a call made to the police and the voice of the 
appellant which they had heard in court. At the appeal hearing, Dr Francis Nolan, Reader in phonetics 
(as he then was) at the University of Cambridge, gave evidence that is summarised in the judgment in 
these terms: 
“He expressed surprise that the jury were allowed to listen to the tapes and, in effect, make up 
their own minds. The members of the jury were, he said in his report, naturally not in a 
position to carry out instrumental acoustic analysis, nor even to bring to bear the kinds of 
phonetic and linguistic analysis which the experts used. The jury members were already 
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14 R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 5 
inevitably under psychological bias from the very fact that Mr O'Doherty was in the dock and 
had been confidently identified by a police officer of his acquaintance. In this frame of mind 
it was not surprising if they heard a faint, noisy, partially unintelligible telephone recording of 
a broadly similar voice as being that of Mr O'Doherty.”15 
And later on in even more robust terms: 
“They had no training as to voice quality, pitch and intonation. The telephone recording was 
bad. If what they were doing was trying to remember the voice of Mr O'Doherty which they 
heard under the stressful and distracting context of the court case and later listen to the 999 
tape, that would be disgraceful, he thought.”16 
The Court of Appeal (Northern Ireland) rejected the proposition that juries should be prohibited from 
conducting their own assessment of the identification of a suspect. The Court stated that: 
“It seems to us that if evidence of voice recognition is relied on by the prosecution, the jury 
should be allowed to listen to a tape-recording on which the recognition is based, assuming 
that the jury have heard the accused giving evidence. It also seems to us that the jury may 
listen to a tape-recording of the voice of the suspect in order to assist them in evaluating 
expert evidence and in making up their own minds as to whether the voice on the tapes is the 
voice of the defendant.”17 
The Court reasoned by analogy with a line of authorities from both England and Wales, and Northern 
Ireland which permitted tribunals of fact to make their own assessment of whether a person captured 
in a video is the defendant they can see before them in court. Insofar as visual identifications are 
concerned this rule remains good law in England and Wales.  
A series of authorities from Australia indicate a much less cautious (and as we shall discuss later, 
potentially unsafe) approach to the question of jury comparisons. In Bulejcik, the appellant was 
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charged with drugs offences and part of the case against him came from a recording of the 
Defendant’s voice captured on an undercover recording device, the tape-recording of which was 
exhibited to the jury. 18  The defendant at the trial made an unsworn statement in front of the jury, 
implying he was not the person on the tape.  The trial judge directed the jury that they could use their 
own recollection of the defendant’s voice at trial in assessing whether he was the person on the tape. 
Following the summing up, the tape of the defendant’s voice made during the court proceedings was 
replayed to the jury. The appeal was allowed, on the technical ground that the tape of the defendant’s 
unsworn statement had not formally been admitted in evidence, however the High Court of Australia 
were content to accept that but for that, the conviction would have been safe. Toohey and Gaudron JJ 
noted the distinction between ‘voice identification’ and ‘voice matching’ commenting that: 
“Where two voices are being heard side-by-side, as occurred in the present case, the concern 
is not with familiarity or distinctiveness but with whether the quality and quantity of the 
material is sufficient to enable a useful comparison to be made… As to the quality and 
quantity of the material being compared, clearly the greater the amount of material, the 
greater the similarity in the circumstances in which the voices were spoken or recorded and 
the greater the number of similar words used, the more useful the comparison.  A jury would 
also benefit from hearing the material more than once so as to enable them to concentrate on 
both similarities and dissimilarities.  Counsel for each side should have the opportunity to 
point out or emphasise particular similarities or dissimilarities to the jury.  The defence may 
wish to call expert evidence where the jury may have difficulty in drawing a distinction 
between two voices of a particular nationality or dialect.” 
In Korgbara the trial judge extended this principle in allowing the jury to compare the defendant’s 
voice at trial (spoken in English) with recordings where an individual spoke in Igbo (a Nigerian 
language). On appeal against conviction, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the 
argument that a jury should not be permitted to make comparisons between voices speaking different 
                                                          
18 Bulejcik v R [1995] HCA 54; 185 CLR 375 
languages without expert evidence. The court concluded that to do otherwise would be to create an 
arbitrary rule which was inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the principles laid down in 
Bulecjik. 19  
In the U.S.A. the practice of allowing jurors to make their own comparisons is permitted. In U.S. v 
Williams a defendant was compelled to read an extract from Time magazine in front of the jury to 
allow a voice comparison to be made with an undercover recording of a drug deal.20 The primary 
challenge to this approach on appeal was not to argue that it might promote an inaccurate 
identification but instead that it was a breach of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. This 
approach was rejected on appeal. 
If it is possible to discern a common thread in these authorities it is of a pragmatic approach, where 
the greater the clarity of the recording and exposure to the suspect’s voice the jury have, the more 
confidence there is that the jury can make their own assessment. However even in those cases where 
experts are relied upon, the jury will be the final arbiters of fact and whilst an expert may direct them 
on those factors of relevance in making the voice-comparison exercise that assessment will be theirs 
to make. 
The problems of voice-comparison exercises: The influence of estimator variables and system 
variables 
We would argue that the current approach of the law to voice matching exercises is too vague and that 
guidance is needed; primarily to assist courts in determining when and how juries should be permitted 
to listen recordings but also to assist juries with the factors they should incorporate into their 
assessment of the evidence. To date, much of the consideration of whether jurors should be allowed to 
engage in voice-comparison decisions has focused on the quality of the material to be played but with 
little discussion of other factors which might impact upon the jury’s assessment of the evidence, 
including the way in which the comparison exercise is conducted. Jurors undertaking a voice-
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comparison exercise are being asked to undertake a cognitive task: to make a decision, and to assess 
the certainty they have in this decision. This task is not isolated; certain external factors influence both 
the accuracy and the confidence in the decision-making process. In order to provide guidance to 
judges and juries there is a need to identify those factors which maximise the chances of an accurate 
comparison being made whilst ensuring any factors which might be unduly prejudicial are minimised. 
The discipline of psychology is able to inform the development of these guidelines, providing an 
understanding of the variables which impact upon the decision-making process. It is sensible to take 
the lead from eyewitness psychology research, and separate the variables likely to influence voice-
comparison accuracy into two categories. When assessing the accuracy of witnesses to crime, 
psychologists often refer to ‘estimator variables’ and ‘system variables.’21 The former are variables 
that the legal system cannot control; e.g., the age of the witness, or whether the perpetrator attempted 
a disguise. The latter are variables which can be controlled by the legal system. These include 
variables such as the way in which questions are asked of witnesses, or the type of identification 
procedure that is used. These categories are also relevant to voice-comparison exercises. In this 
context, estimator variables relate to the quality/nature of the recording and the listener, and system 
variables relate to the way in which recordings are presented for comparison. The criminal justice 
system must be vigilant to both estimator and system variables if it is to minimise the risk of 
miscarriages of justice. Roberts uses the analogy of diseases to explain the difference between the two 
variables both in terms of their cause and the responses the justice system can take to avoid 
miscarriages of justice. He describes estimator variables as being something the justice system is 
“powerless to prevent” but to which the criminal justice system should be alert and implement “an 
effective screening programme.” The system variables on the other hand are “caused by practices and 
procedures” of the system which can be avoided with appropriate regimens.22 We therefore discuss 
                                                          
21 Wells, G. L. (1978). “Applied eyewitness-testimony research: System variables and estimator 
variables.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(12), 1546-1557. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.36.12.1546 
 
22 Roberts A. The problem of mistaken identification: Some observations on process. International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof (2004) 8 E&P 100-119 
some examples of each. This list is not exhaustive, but illustrates some areas where variables have the 
potential to distort the accuracy of the process which deserve consideration by fact-finders. 
Estimator variables 
Better understanding of estimator variables in the criminal justice system will help to diagnose the 
likelihood of inaccurate voice-comparisons by lay witnesses. The accuracy of voice-comparisons by 
non-experts is a relatively under-researched area. In this section we discuss the likely effect of 
estimator variables on performance based on existing literature, and suggest how the justice system 
could perform the kind of ‘screening’ suggested by Roberts. There is still much research to be done in 
this field but the fact there are gaps in knowledge suggest the legal system should be especially 
cautious of adopting an ‘ad hoc’ approach in this area. 
Physical attributes of the listener.  
The possibility that personal characteristics of a witness may impact upon their fallibility as an eye-
witness is well known; the short-sighted eyewitness would fall within the criteria of an observation 
which was ‘impeded’ within the criteria of Turnbull.23 There has, however, been little discussion in 
the legal literature of the impact of the personal characteristics of the listener on voice identification 
accuracy when assessing evidence in court. Perhaps nowhere is this more important than in cases 
where perceptions of the qualities of two different voices are relevant to the determination a jury has 
to make. The ability to perceive all the attributes of a sample of speech which may make it similar or 
dissimilar to another sample is dependent to a large part upon the range of sounds a listener is able to 
hear. 
Age is associated with a decline in hearing; hearing begins to degrade from around 40 years of age,24 
which has obvious implications for the accuracy of voice-comparison. The upper age for eligibility for 
jury service in England and Wales is now 75 years of age which suggests approximately 61% of 
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jurors are at risk of experiencing age-related hearing degradation.25 Age-related hearing loss is 
particularly associated with difficulty in extracting a ‘signal’ (i.e. the voice) from ‘noise’ (i.e. any kind 
of background interference)26. This is particularly relevant in cases where a voice has been recorded 
against a noisy background; older listeners may struggle to isolate vocal sounds from background 
noise and make an accurate comparison.  
Advocates and judges need therefore to be alert to the fact that members of the jury may vary in terms 
of their hearing sensitivity, and that this may compromise their ability to accurately compare 
recordings. Jurors should be directed to be aware of this in their deliberations. 
Quality of recording.  
The quality of the recording (or recordings) has formed the basis for much of the discussions in the 
case law. If a voice is recorded on separate occasions using different equipment, the voice will sound 
different in each sample. Many of the cases likely to be encountered in the criminal justice system 
involve recordings of telephone calls where there is a dispute as to the speaker. In many cases the 
comparison will be being made with either a recording of the defendant speaking in interview or in 
court: this is likely to make accurate comparisons difficult. 27 The frequency spectrum of natural 
speech can fall in a range between 50-10000 Hz, but telephones only capture and transmit that speech 
which falls within the range of 300-3400 Hz.28 This reduced bandwith means that certain sounds (for 
example those characterised by high frequency energy, such as ‘s’ and ‘sh’) may be removed by 
transmission over a telephone, distorting the sound which is recorded. Where different telephones are 
                                                          
25 Based on figures contained in the 2011 census. Office for National Statistics 2011 “Census: Population 
Estimates for the United Kingdom, March 2011” 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins
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26 Zekveld, A. A., Kramer, S. E., & Festen, J. M. (2011). Cognitive load during speech perception in noise: The 
influence of age, hearing loss, and cognition on the pupil response. Ear and Hearing, 32(4), 498-510. doi: 
10.1097/AUD.0b013e31820512bb 
27 Hirson, A., French, P., & Howard, D. (1995). “Speech fundamental frequency over the telephone and face-to-
face: some implications for forensic phonetics.” Studies in General and English Phonetics: Essays in Honour of 
Professor JD O’Connor, 230-240. 
28 Kerstholt, J. H., Jansen, N. J., Van Amelsvoort, A. G., & Broeders, A. P. A. (2006). “Earwitnesses: Effects of 
accent, retention and telephone.” Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(2), 187-197.doi: 10.1002/acp.1175 
involved the situation is further complicated as voices can sound different when recorded through 
landline and mobile phones,29 making comparison less accurate. 30 
Voice recordings obtained through covert recording are likely to feature background noise, which 
may disrupt the perception of voice identity. Background noise impairs speech perception31 and masks 
cues such as pitch,32which is one of the most important features used by listeners in attaching an 
identity to a voice.33 There is some evidence that background noise negatively affects performance in 
voice matching exercises.34 This is particularly so when background noise features in one recording 
but not the other. 35 
Although the quality of the recording is recognised in the case law as causing difficulties in voice-
comparison exercises, the reasons and nature of the problems are not fully articulated. Whilst 
recording-quality may be acknowledged as an obstacle to be overcome it does not appear to be fully 
understood as a factor which may distort the outcome and result in erroneous decisions being made. 
Differences in voice (especially voice used in court which may adjusted to meet conditions).  
The human voice is not produced consistently and there is a wide a range of variation in the voice 
qualities of an individual speaker. Even if the recording equipment is identical, ‘within-speaker 
variability’ means that the same voice can sound very different in different situations. Although some 
voice features are relatively stable (e.g. pitch), others (e.g. tempo variation) are more likely to vary, 
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32 Qin, M. K., & Oxenham, A. J. (2003). “Effects of simulated cochlear-implant processing on speech reception 
in fluctuating maskers. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 114(1), 446-454.doi: 
10.1121/1.1579009 
33 Nolan, F., McDougall, K., & Hudson, T. (2011, August). “Some acoustic correlates of perceived (dis) 
similarity between same-accent voices.” In International Congress of Phonetic Sciences (ICPhS) (pp. 1506-
1509). 
34 Bartle, A., & Dellwo, V. (2015). “Auditory speaker discrimination by forensic phoneticians and naïve 
listeners in voiced and whispered speech.” International Journal of Speech, Language & the Law, 22(2), 229-
248. doi: 10.1558/ijsll.v22i2.23101 
35 Smith, H. M. J., Baguley, T. S., Robson, J., Dunn A. K., Stacey, P. C. (under review). “Forensic voice 
discrimination: The effect of speech type and background noise on performance” 
for example, between read speech and conversational speech.36Witnesses giving evidence from the 
witness box in a trial are frequently required to speak at a volume which is audible to the judge and 
jury and to adjust the pace of their speech to ensure that notes can be taken. This may result in 
substantial changes to the speech from that which is present on the contested recording, and will affect 
listeners’ ability to compare speech samples. Research has shown voice-comparison accuracy is 
higher when within-speaker variability is limited.37  
It is not just the mismatch which is important though; some speaking styles obscure important identity 
cues. Covert recordings commonly feature whispered speech, but when a person is whispering, cues 
such as fundamental frequency (which is the lowest and loudest component of the voice and therefore 
central to recognition) are not present. Bartle and Dellwo compared discrimination accuracy across 
voiced and whispered speech and, perhaps unsurprisingly, found that accuracy was lower when 
speech was whispered.38 
It is not uncommon for perpetrators committing an offence via the telephone to disguise their speech, 
particularly if the crime is abduction or blackmail. The most commonly adopted disguises are 
relatively crude, involving methods such as deliberately lowering pitch or mimicking a foreign 
accent.39 Nevertheless, even unsophisticated methods lead to higher rates of incorrect voice 
discrimination when one voice is disguised and the other is not, compared to when neither voice is 
disguised.40  Although this is an area where there is scope for further research, it would appear to be 
unwise to allow juries to reach their own conclusions in this respect. 
Language (s) 
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Although the courts in England and Wales have avoided asking juries to conduct voice-comparisons 
in languages other than English, cases such as Korgbara indicate that it is feasible that juries might be 
asked to listen to recordings which capture speech in a foreign language. Evidence shows that 
performing the voice-comparison task under these circumstances has the potential to compromise 
accuracy. People are more accurate when comparing samples of the same language rather than 
different languages, even when one of the languages is their own.41Based on these results, it would 
seem that if a sample captures speech in a language other than that of the tribunal then a voice-
comparison exercise should never be carried out by the jury. However even where the voice being 
compared is in English it should not be assumed that this ends the need for care. In the 2011 census, 
7.7% of the population reported speaking a language other than English as their main language.42 
Although statistically jurors who do not speak English as a first language are unlikely to comprise a 
significant proportion of any given jury panel, the potential for an individual juror to be less able to 
perform a voice-comparison exercise is something that the court should be alert to and address. 
System variables 
Much of the discussion in this area (both legal and psychological) has centred on estimator variables,  
however without knowledge of system variables, the criminal justice system will be unable to 
improve procedures and maximise the chances that accurate voice-comparison decisions are reached.  
In this section we identify those areas where an understanding of system variables might help improve 
the accuracy of decision making. 
It is perhaps helpful to consider how voice-comparison exercises might operate within the trial 
process. Assuming that the prosecution are seeking to rely on a recording of speech where they allege 
the speaker is the defendant, this is likely to be played at a comparatively early stage of the 
prosecution case. If there is an expert being called to perform an auditory analysis they may present 
the results of their analysis alongside a known sample. Otherwise the exhibit may be presented by the 
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witness responsible for the recording. A known sample of the voice may be presented later during the 
prosecution case (for example by playing a recording of the police station interview) or the 
prosecution may be reliant on the jury hearing the defendant speak in court, usually when testifying as 
part of the defence case. Upon retirement the jury may be permitted to rehear any exhibits but cannot 
compel the defendant to speak again. 
As the case law illustrates, the ways in which to-be-compared voices may be presented to a jury vary 
from case to case. There may be the situations of the type which occurred in Kapikanya where the 
recording is heard for the first time in cross-examination. In most cases the jury will be given no 
direction about what use they can make of the recordings until after the evidence has finished and they 
are retiring to consider their decision. It is necessary to fully explore whether such variations in 
procedure are likely to affect the accuracy of comparisons. 
Sequencing of playback 
Unlike faces, which can easily be presented alongside each other for comparison, when comparing 
voices listeners must hear the voices sequentially. The order in which the sequence is played may 
produce different results. When there is more than one recording of a voice, each recording is likely to 
have different characteristics; one might be better in quality than the other, or both might feature 
different styles of speech. In our own research, we asked participants to compare one recording that 
featured background noise to another that did not. Accuracy was higher when listeners heard the 
recording with background noise after they had heard the one with no background noise.43 
Gap in time between two samples 
Sequential presentation of voices requires consideration for another reason. Although there will 
inevitably be a short gap in between the two voices, the length of this gap is likely to affect 
performance. To reach an accurate voice-comparison decision, it is necessary for the listener to have a 
clear mental representation for the voices that are to be compared - even high-quality auditory 
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representations start to degrade after only a couple of seconds.44 It is possible there may be a critical 
time period within which both samples must be heard for any decision on the comparison to be 
meaningful although research has not yet established this. On the basis of what is known however, 
there is a strong argument for juries only being permitted to hear voices when they can hear both 
voices in immediate succession. 
Bias  
It could be argued that voice-matching decisions made in court are inherently biased compared to 
those conducted in experimental conditions. There is a danger that the jury will allow the knowledge 
they have about a case (i.e. that there is other evidence against the suspect is on trial) to influence their 
decision. This risk is amplified by the fact that, unlike visual identification procedures conducted on 
eyewitnesses, the identifying party (the jury) will have been told that a witness (expert or lay) has 
identified the suspect as the speaker.  
The role of bias deserves more attention in relation to voice-comparison decisions. Bias plays an 
important role in eyewitness identifications decisions.45 For example, to reduce the risk of a mistaken 
identification, it is recommended that eye and ear witnesses completing identity parades be warned 
that the perpetrator may or may not be present (Annex A para. 11 Code of Practice D, Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act46). This instruction has been shown to reduce false positive identifications.47  
Whilst it is impossible to eliminate subconscious bias caused by the knowledge that the accused is on 
trial and, in most cases, the existence of other evidence, consideration should be given to a clear 
direction, delivered in advance of any evidence being presented that the voice on the recording may or 
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may not be the defendant. The jury should also be reminded in summing up of the factors which may 
cause extraneous influence on their decision making. 
Acoustics of the courtroom  
The physical location in which the identification takes place is another area which may impact upon 
the accuracy of decision making.  In research investigating voice-comparison accuracy, participants 
complete experiments in a quiet room, and/or wear headphones to suppress external ambient noise. 
Courtrooms do not replicate these conditions. Acoustics of a room can impact the sound which is 
heard.48 The court estate in England and Wales comprises a diverse body of premises whose design 
has been influenced by a number of competing factors.49  Although standardised guides for court 
design which incorporated acoustic standards were in existence between 2004 and 2010 50 there is still 
evidence of issues of audibility even within courtrooms which meet these standards.51 
Lay-listeners in court must contend with noise from their immediate environment in addition to any 
interference with the recording. Furthermore, issues relating to the acoustics of the courtroom such as 
reverberance, echoes, and sound diffusion can affect intelligibility as well as voice quality,52 and may 
make the voice-comparison task challenging. 
There is still research needed on the accuracy of voice-comparison exercises conducted in a 
courtroom setting and the extent to which the effect of system variables can be minimised. Playing the 
recordings to jury members through headphones might be advisable in cases where two voice 
recordings exist. In cases where a recording is compared to a live speaker (i.e. the defendant), it 
should also be acknowledged that speaker-listener distance has an effect on speech and voice 
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perception.53 Distance risks weaker voice cues becoming inaudible, particularly for listeners with age-
related hearing loss.54 This may have a deleterious effect on voice-comparison performance. Careful 
consideration should be given to whether it is appropriate for juries to be comparing voices being 
relayed from two different locations in the courtroom. If this is unavoidable they need careful 
directions on the possibility of distortion and change in sound. 
Towards a rational approach 
The apparent simplicity with which a voice comparison exercise can be conducted in court belies the 
complexity of what is being asked of jurors and the, potentially, very significant consequences for an 
accused. Although this is an area where further research may be of benefit the theme which emerges 
from the current research is that there a number of different variables which can result in juries 
misinterpreting the evidence they are presented with. This is not to say important evidence should be 
excluded from the trial process, but that if it is to be introduced, it must be done with caution, 
ensuring that where variables cannot be eliminated, steps are taken to minimise their impact. 
As a starting point, jurors should not be asked to make a comparison between voices unless there is 
expert auditory evidence which supports the assertion that they are similar (or dissimilar as the case 
may be). The role of the juror should be limited to that described by Ormerod, namely scrutinising 
and evaluating the work of the expert. The difference may initially appear a semantic one as a jury 
conducting such an exercise will still be required to hear and make an evaluation of the similarity 
between two voices; there is however an important distinction between this approach and an unaided 
comparison. Jurors who are scrutinising the auditory analysis of an expert are provided with guidance 
as to which support the conclusion being reached; their task is to examine whether these features are 
present. Jurors conducting this task without that assistance are being required to make a simple match 
with very little guidance on what they should be looking for.  
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If a party seeks to introduce a recording without such expert (either to inculpate or exculpate a 
defendant) it should be treated as inadmissible for that purpose. This should apply equally, whether it 
is the prosecution seeking to adduce the evidence to implicate a defendant, or a co-defendant seeking 
to implicate a co-accused. Whilst the criminal courts are understandably reluctant to limit defence 
evidence, there is a requirement that such evidence be legally relevant, namely that a jury properly 
directed ‘could place some weight upon it.’  Whilst this threshold is low it is arguably not met in cases 
where there is no expert to perform the matching exercise.   
When an expert presents evidence of a voice comparison they should produce the recordings upon 
which their conclusions are based. This should be in a format where the known voice and the 
contested voice are played sequentially and in quick succession. Where factors such as background 
noise are present, the sequencing of the recording should be such that the recording with the least 
interference is heard first. 
Where a recording is to be played to the jury, before hearing the exhibits, they should receive a clear 
judicial direction as to the nature of the exercise they are being asked to perform and the potential 
limitations. Ideally jurors should have the opportunity to listen to the tape via headphones. If the jury 
request that the recording be played again at a later stage in the trial, they should listen to the entire 
recording in open court and be reminded of those features which the expert has identified as being 
relevant to the comparison. 
The warnings given to the jury about the limitations should be repeated in summing up with jurors 
receiving a warning akin to a Turnbull direction. This will include case specific warnings on factors 
such as the length and quality of the recordings being used as well as cautioning the jury on factors 
which may impede their individual perceptions such as degradation in hearing. Where the language 
being compared is not English, the jury should be warned in the clearest possible terms about the 
difficulty of non-native speakers performing comparisons. 
Voice identification will always be a particularly challenging forensic exercise. We suggest that the 
steps outlined above go some way to rationalising the process when part of the evidence against an 
accused is a contested voice recording. By adopting an approach informed by inter-disciplinary 
research the possibility of mistakes being made by jurors can be reduced. As research in this area 
develops it may well be the case that this process is refined and improved, however unless there is a 
recognition of the difficulties involved with voice comparison, the risks of wrongful convictions will 
be substantial. 
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